Page 60 - INSS | 2019-2020

enable Israeli force buildup and the readiness to fight against three entities in the north – Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria
– and simultaneously contend with the terrorist organizations from Gaza. The “fire on all fronts scenario” requires
thinking about priorities and linkage between the respective arenas and fronts, and the achievement required on
each front. INSS is engaged in research on the issue, and will present its findings and analysis to decision makers
in the second half of 2020. In addition, effort must be channeled to update the public’s expectations regarding the
threat Israel faces, and even more so – regarding the possible responses.

4. The Palestinian Authority

The INSS Plan, first published in October 2018, remains the optimal approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It
includes an additional attempt at Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and, in the event that fails, pursuit of independent
steps to maintain Israel’s character as a Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral state. It is crucial to prepare for the
day after Mahmoud Abbas’s rule ends, while continuing to encourage economic development in the PA. Publication
of the Trump plan, which will attempt to set new parameters for an agreement and recognize the reality created over
the past fifty years, is highly significant.

5. The Terror Organizations in Gaza

As INSS noted in 2018, it may be possible to reach an arrangement with Hamas. In steering clear of fighting in Operation
Black Belt between Israel and Islamic Jihad in November 2019, Hamas illustrated interest in an arrangement as
part of its move to prioritize the economic and social situation in Gaza over another clash with Israel. That said, the
organization frequently challenges Israel with low levels of rocket fire and friction along the border fence, due to
domestic considerations and for the purpose of extracting concessions from Israel.

A long term ceasefire is possible only if the strategic (and not ideological) demands of both sides are reasonably
met. Hamas would receive the opening of Gaza to the world and its reconstruction and development, and Israel
would receive the restoration of quiet in the south, mechanisms for ensuring the prevention of terror groups’ military
buildup and smuggling, and a reasonable solution to the issue of the captured and missing Israelis.

If no arrangement is reached, the INSS recommendation since 2012 has been to plan and conduct a military campaign
that is fundamentally different from the campaigns of the past decade. It must surprise, maneuver, and focus vis-à-vis
Hamas’s military wing – and end with a political process in order to reach an arrangement from a position of strength.

6. The United States

The US elections could alter the current reality by replacing an administration that is friendly toward Israel with
one that is problematic. In the face of American isolationism, which crosses party lines, Israel must repeatedly
emphasize that it does not want the United States to fight and shed blood in its defense; as a strategic asset and
reliable ally for Washington, it is in the US interest to back it militarily and politically. Israel must do everything it
can to return to its status as an issue of broad consensus among Democrats and Republicans alike. Israel must also
make a significant effort to restore close relations with the large segment of the American Jewish population that
has become alienated in part as a result of Israeli policies that are not sensitive to the variety of denominations of
Judaism in the United States.

7. Russia and China

Russia is not an enemy of Israel, and the strategic dialogue between them must be continued to prevent a collision
in places where the two countries’ military forces operate in close proximity and where their interests diverge. As
an ally of two of Israel’s enemies, Iran and Syria, Russia turns a blind eye to Hezbollah’s buildup. Follow-through on
Russia’s promise to remove Iranian forces from Syria could signify the potential for closer relations between Russia
and Syria, possibly resulting in greater limitations on Israel’s freedom of action in Syria. In any event, as is the case
with China, Israel must work openly and in close cooperation with the United States on matters pertaining to Russia.

58 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL