Page 57 - INSS | 2019-2020

The Strategic Balance

Israel was preoccupied with two election campaigns in 2019 and barely initiated any measures to improve its strategic
position. The government engaged in steps such as the celebration of the Trump administration’s recognition of
Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights – following its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in late 2017
– but there was stagnation and even significant regression regarding issues central to Israeli security. In the overall
strategic picture, many elements changed for the worse.

One negative development is the narrowing of technological gaps and erosion of Israel’s qualitative advantage
over its enemies. The clearest expression of this phenomenon is the Iranian precision missile project, which has
established production and upgrade capabilities; Hezbollah already has dozens of precision missiles at its disposal.

The Palestinian arena can be characterized as a political stalemate, which includes a complete lack of contact
between Jerusalem and Ramallah. Meanwhile, in Gaza, Hamas and Islamic Jihad continue their military buildup;
Israeli communities near the Gaza border bear the toll of the ongoing conflict; and terrorist organizations threaten to
paralyze daily life for over half of Israel’s population, including the Tel Aviv area. A broader perspective indicates that
Israel’s relations with the Sunni Arab world are not progressing – perhaps even the opposite is true. No diplomatic
breakthrough with the Gulf states was achieved in 2019; the gradual deterioration of relations with Jordan continues;
and only relations with Egypt remain stable.

Israel’s budget suffers from a significant deficit, and the need to increase the defense budget due to the deterioration
of Israel’s strategic situation only exacerbates the problem. Finally, looking inwards, Israeli society is divided and
the government is busy with indecisive election campaigns, which leads to wasted resources, institutional paralysis,
and the inability to formulate strategy and make decisions on central issues.

However, there are some positive changes in the global and regional environment that have the potential to
improve Israel’s national security situation. Signs of a second wave of upheaval in the Middle East emerged in 2019,
particularly the latter months, this time mainly in states oriented toward Iran (Iraq and Lebanon) and even in Iran
itself. Continued economic pressure on Iran could bring about a reduction in the resources available for its nuclear
and regional activities.

The United States has not withdrawn from the Middle East entirely (bases and soldiers in the Gulf remain in place,
and additional forces were deployed in the region following the killing of Soleimani), and at this stage Israel continues
to enjoy relations with a friendly administration that largely sees eye to eye with it on events in the region and
endorses Israeli interests. The partial isolationism embraced by the United States, despite its dangers for Israel,
may ultimately raise Israel’s prestige and value in the eyes of leaders in the United States as well as pragmatic Arab
states. In addition, Israel positioned itself as an essential player in the Syrian theater, and reached agreement in
principle with the United States and Russia regarding the need to remove Iranian forces from Syria – although thus
far the agreement has not translated into practice.

Finally, there appear to be signs of emerging understandings in the Palestinian system. The Palestinian Authority in
the West Bank seems to recognize that a resolution of the conflict will not be imposed by the international system,
and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, has internalized that terrorism will not resolve the conflict.

Assessments

When considering and comparing the positive and negative developments of the past year, several insights emerge.
The first is awareness that Israel’s strategic confusion prevents constructive political discourse on the level of national
leadership. Two election campaigns in 2019 and the plethora of negotiations to form a government led to the failure
to formulate up-to-date security concepts. Second is the clear understanding that having exhausted the campaign
between wars in the northern arena, current Israeli conduct points toward escalation. This requires adjusting the
tools, methods, arenas, and pace of operations, with the requisite modifications in preparation and allocation of
resources. Third, today’s circumstances demand a discussion in principle of the relevance of a preventive attack, in
particular against the Iranian precision missile project in Lebanon and Syria.

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