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Iran’s inching toward the nuclear threshold; and escalation between Iran and the United States, particularly after
the targeted killing, which might include Israel. These possibilities demand that close understandings and a joint
strategy be coordinated between Israel and the United States. In case of negotiations between the US and Iran, it is
necessary for Israel to be in agreement with the Washington on the content of an improved nuclear deal with Iran
compared to the 2015 agreement, along with reaching a “parallel agreement” on a joint policy against Iran and on
a strategy for dealing with gradual Iranian progress toward nuclear weapons. In tandem, it is important to examine
with the United States how to help the Iranian people who are rising up against the regime. However, Israel must
prepare for the possibility that the US will be disinterested or distracted and that it will be left alone to deal with the
Iran nuclear issue, and therefore it must ensure that it has a credible military option. Building such an option is a
difficult process that requires diverting resources from other important matters and allocating them to strengthen
offensive strike capabilities.

2. Iran’s Consolidation in Syria and the Precision Missile Project

Israel’s success in blocking Iran’s consolidation in Syria in 2018 and 2019 is relative, temporary, and not final. It is
also a mistake to maintain the same strategic framework while the reality is changing. Iranian consolidation has
been largely diverted to Iraq and Lebanon, arenas where it is more difficult for Israel to operate, and has been
bolstered by a response policy that is more brazen and immediate on Tehran’s part (at least until the assassination
of Soleimani). It is now important to recognize the diminished relevance of the campaign between wars and to
develop an operational solution against the critical elements of the consolidation in Lebanon and Iraq as well – chief
among them the precision missile project. Taking steps toward that end has the potential for significant escalation.

The threat of hundreds or thousands of precision missiles from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran is a strategic threat
of the first order that, if not dealt with in time, could develop into an existential threat. This is the type of threat
that requires in-depth examination and should be addressed by Israel’s security concept. There are five possible
strategies for dealing with it:

Continuation of the campaign between wars – disruption and delay, in which preventing escalation is a priority,
and understanding that this addresses the problem only partially and with diminishing returns.

An active and passive defensive strategy – improving effectiveness and purchasing additional batteries and
interceptors: Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems; and improving resilience of critical infrastructure.
The clear disadvantage is the cost and fact that it does not present a comprehensive or fully effective solution.

Deterrence – a clear and explicit threat that Israel will respond with full force to an attack on its infrastructure and
the IDF. The weak point in this strategy is the enemy’s capability, after accumulating hundreds or thousands of
advanced missiles, to go on a “first strike” strategy to destroy the components of IDF power that form the core
of Israeli deterrence.

P reemptive strike – an attack based on the understanding that in the near term Hezbollah is preparing to attack
Israel. The drawback of this strategy is the fog of intelligence and Hezbollah’s high readiness for war at that point.

Preventive attack – an effective, proactive surprise attack on enemy operational, production, and stockpile assets,
risking escalation to a full-scale war. The legitimacy of such a step should be discussed.

None of the possibilities are exclusive, and striking the right combination of them could provide an adequate response
to the most severe threat posed by the precision missile project.

3. The “First Northern War”

The IDF must ensure preparedness for a multi-arena war (“fire on all fronts scenario”) as a frame of reference. The
era in which Israel would face a single adversary in a single arena is over. Accordingly, the IDF must reassess and
perhaps redefine concepts like “decision,” “victory,” and denial of enemy capabilities. Political leadership must

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