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with the Palestinian Authority, or Israel’s policy toward Hamas in the Gaza
Strip – generated barely any public debate, with the differences between
the political “right” and “left” much less discernible.

In tandem, the past year was characterized by deepening public disputes
stemming from diverse worldviews, especially regarding the necessary
balance between national and religious values and democratic, liberal,
secular ideals. There were further challenges to the need to respect human
rights and ensure the limitation of government power. Under the banner
of strengthened governance, executive and legislative steps were taken to
restrict the legitimacy of criticism of the government on the part of established institutions such as courts, legal
advisors, public attorneys, the state comptroller, the Israel Police, or organs of civil society. Concurrently, the trend
of presenting particular figures and governing systems as opponents of the government and its policies continued.
Branding critics as extreme opposition can have a chilling effect on their assessment and in certain cases even lead
to restrictions of their role.

Such processes and trends threaten the foundations of Israeli democracy. According to the annual INSS National
Security Index, conducted most recently in November 2019, those agreeing with the statement “Israeli democracy
is in danger” increased from 40 percent in 2018 to 55 percent in 2019. Even if the Israeli democratic system appears
strong, there is concern it is weakening, especially in light of similar global trends involving charges (usually on the
part of populist and anti-establishment leaders) of “deep state” and criticism of the “elite” and the liberal order that
were accepted for many years as the solid basis of Western democracies.

The Weakening of Israeli Solidarity

The past year also saw a further weakening of the sense of solidarity within Israeli society. This is typified by the
socio-economic gaps between the rich and the poor and between the center and the periphery. The INSS National
Security Index found that 70 percent of those surveyed agree with the assertion that “the sense of solidarity within
Israeli society has declined.” The holes in social solidarity were evident this past year in the outcry of the Ethiopian
community, which demonstrated against the “over-policing” of their people, and in the protest of the Arab sector
against the state’s incompetence in addressing the increasing crime and violence in their community. Both examples
share a common denominator, as the protests were perceived by the Israeli public as sectoral social phenomena. In
the former case, the Ethiopians received limited support for their struggle from the Israeli public, while in the latter
case, the Arab minority hardly received any public support from the Jewish community. Overall it appears that even
if Israel is a state with significant internal robustness, this past year has seen more disconcerting signs that point to
an accelerated trend of weakening social solidarity within social groups, between social groups and the state, and
between the individual and the state.

The State of Israel’s sensitive relations with the multi-faceted Arab minority has experienced many fluctuations
and profound changes. The relationship is shaped by three main trends, fraught with internal contradictions: first
is the clear aspiration among Arabs in Israel, especially among the younger generation, for civil and even political
integration – despite the low starting point and significant social, economic, and cultural barriers – along with their
desire to maintain a separate national identity. The second reveals hostility and distance on the part of a large
portion of the Jewish public toward the Arab minority, which reinforces and is in turn strengthened by exclusionary
rhetoric and actions by the government and many in the political leadership (for example: the Nation-State Law,
and decided resistance to inclusion of Arab parties in a government coalition). This is complemented by harsh
rhetoric from Arab Israeli leaders. The third trend is the relatively successful implementation of the government
decision on the economic development of minority populations in Israel 2016-2020 (Decision 922), which has
already helped accelerate the Arab community’s integration within Israel’s social tapestry. This complex triangle
creates clear progress toward economic and employment integration, along with signs of a willingness for social
and even political integration within the state’s multilayered fabric. In the long term, these trends may advance the
(still limited) legitimization of the Arab community in Israel. A substantive test of the state’s sensitive relations with
the Arab sector will be how it addresses the increasing violence and crime within the community. Possible success
in this crucial field depends greatly on joint efforts – still in their early stages – between the state’s institutions and
the Arab community and its leaderships.

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