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The Events of 2019

On the operational level, several events in 2019 reflected deep processes connected to the military buildup of Israel’s
enemies and their approach to the use of military force. Among them:

Iran’s September 2019 attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia with precision-guided cruise missiles and unmanned
aerial vehicles illustrated Iran’s audacity and the advances in the precision strike capabilities of the radical Shiite axis.

Two escalation events with the Gaza Strip that involved large numbers of rockets fired at Israeli territory demonstrated
the ability of terrorist organizations in Gaza to overturn the routine of Israel’s civilian population. In May 2019,
when some 700 rockets were fired, four Israelis were killed by rockets and an anti-tank missile fired by Hamas. In
response to a Hamas cyberattack, Israel attacked a cyber complex from the air. In November, some 450 rockets
were fired following the targeted killing of an Islamic Jihad leader, and Islamic Jihad succeeded in shutting down
daily life in the Tel Aviv area for a full day. These events also included the use of heavy rockets, whose damage is
liable to be significantly greater than that caused by regular rockets.

In September 2019 Hezbollah launched anti-tank missiles at an IDF vehicle and outpost on the northern border
(with no injuries) following an Israeli attack on Iranian drones and another attack that was attributed to Israel
on Hezbollah’s precision missile project. The event illustrated the risks of escalation on the northern border,
Hezbollah’s ability to organize an offensive operation relatively quickly using “simple” means, and the current
role of drones as offensive weapons.

The Israeli operation that began in December 2018 to neutralize the attack tunnels dug by Hezbollah along the
Lebanese border revealed the importance that Hezbollah, like Hamas, places on inserting a large number of
fighters into Israeli territory in war.

The Operational Concept of the Radical Shiite Axis

In recent years, Hezbollah and Hamas, supported by Iran, have assumed a prominent role as enemies with significant
military capabilities. The combat patterns of these organizations (and additional groups) have a common denominator,
and stem from similar strategic and operational ideas that in recent decades developed among various groups “on the
other side of the fence.” They are grounded in the deep recognition of Israel’s military-technological superiority, and

an assessment that this superiority can be offset
by attacking Israel’s weak spots: its sensitivity to
casualties; its difficulty in coping with a prolonged
war; and the limitations that result from its
preference for airpower and reluctance to engage
in ground maneuvers.

US Government / DigitalGlobe This doctrine, which has become more
sophisticated over the years, emphasizes the
Saudi oil facility hit in an exact strike following the Iranian attack in September need to improve survivability and the ability to
2019. A new phase in Iranian capability and audacity. sustain hits, in order to allow greater endurance
and the ability to maintain military force in the face
of Israel’s capabilities. Also emphasized are the
need to establish credible deterrence capability –
first and foremost in order to prevent large-scale
clashes that they prefer to avoid – and the idea
of attrition as the key to victory, due to Israeli
sensitivity to prolonged war and to casualties.
This doctrine is what led these organizations (and
additional entities, including states such as Iran

50 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL