Page 49 - INSS | 2019-2020

Nevertheless, the Israeli economy suffers from a series of weaknesses that constitute challenges to society. Chief
among those is the large economic gap between different sectors, such as between Arabs and Jews, ultra-Orthodox
and secular, and periphery and center populations, and between different employment sectors.

The government should consider ways to reduce the socio-economic gaps and increase the integration of ultra-
Orthodox men and Arab women into the labor market and increase their productivity. In addition, it is essential to
solve traffic congestion, which hampers productivity as it negatively affects the quality of life, and to lower housing
costs. On these issues, no significant progress was evident in the past year, partly because of the political deadlock.
Beyond that, the Israeli economy is dependent to a large extent on export, such that a global recession might
adversely affect the local economic standing. In the military-economic sphere, the government must approve as
soon as possible a multi-year IDF plan, which is supposed to respond to the growing security challenges on the one
hand and be responsive to the economic needs on the other.

A Look to the Future

Without a solution to the ongoing political impasse, without preserving the requisite balance of the national identity
of the State of Israel, and without enhancing social solidarity, serious concern will arise regarding potential further
weakening of Israeli society. There are already signs of risks and crises in four main domains: undermining of the
delicate balance regarding Israel’s identity as a Jewish and democratic state, especially in its tilting toward the Jewish
pole at the expense of the democratic pillar; the deepening of social and economic gaps, especially in the event of
a major economic crisis; the transformation of the public discourse in Israel into a violent struggle of hatred and
exclusion of the “other”; and the consequent weakening of societal resilience in Israel.

These risks could create an even greater gap between the different sectors in Israeli society, and possibly also impact
negatively on the increasingly sensitive relationship between Israel and Diaspora Jewry. The convergence of these
discernible trends could result in reduced social and human capital in Israel and might weaken its capacity to stand
up to internal and external threats.

Under conditions of a large-scale military conflict, public mobilization and the demonstration of support for the IDF
would be expected, as in the past. However, a deterioration of the military and civil situation following a protracted
conflict and wide-scale damage to the home front, particularly without sufficient civil preparedness, could jeopardize
societal resilience in Israel. This could be reflected in a reduction of the state’s economic and civil abilities to manage
daily life successfully during times of emergency and maintain functional continuity during a conflict. It could
even disrupt the subsequent recovery process following the possible severe destruction of the national social and
infrastructure systems.

Consequently, Israel should invest in system-wide preparation efforts, in accordance with an existing long range
plan, so as to strengthen the preparedness of the civilian front in Israel. This plan would include the construction
and empowerment of new and existing resilience mechanisms that are closely connected to the social dimensions
discussed above.

Israeltourism [CC BY 2.0]

Israel’s Supreme Court in Jerusalem. A challenge to the rule of law and its institutions poses a test of basic democratic principles that are
an inherent part of Israel’s identity.

ISRAELI SOCIETY 47