Page 42 - INSS | 2019-2020

Significance and a Look to the Future

There are several alternatives for Israel’s policy toward Hamas and the Gaza Strip:

R eaching understandings with Hamas through Egyptian mediation and agreeing on an extended ceasefire, in
exchange for significantly easing the closure of Gaza

C reating conditions for intra-Palestinian reconciliation as leverage for restoring the Palestinian Authority’s control
over Gaza (an alternative that is not in Israel’s hands)

C ontinuing the current policy of conflict management, while adjusting to changes in the situation

C ompletely severing Gaza from Israel and the West Bank

Launching a military campaign to defeat the Hamas and Islamic Jihad military wings

The preferred and most feasible alternative is a long term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas reached with Egyptian
mediation, preferably in coordination with the Palestinian Authority – although the likelihood of this is low –
which would include significantly easing the closure of Gaza and advancing infrastructure projects. Under current
circumstances, it appears that a wide-scale military campaign will not give Israel a decided negotiating advantage
or better negotiating conditions than what can already be achieved today, and there is even a danger of the collapse
of governmental capacity in the Gaza Strip. In addition, a military move of this sort will not lead to a solution that
guarantees against Hamas and Islamic Jihad military buildup.

In this context, Egypt has a central role in stabilizing Gaza, and it has positioned itself as the exclusive mediator
between Israel and Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Cairo is trying gently to balance opposing interests: on the one hand,
it seeks to bring about an extended arrangement and ceasefire between Israel and Hamas – without being drawn
into involvement and responsibility for Gaza – in order to promote stability and security that would contribute to
the revival of tourism in Sinai and to economic projects in northern Sinai. On the other hand, it does not see Hamas
as part of a permanent solution, and it is interested in the PA’s return to power in Gaza. At the same time, Cairo is
working to block the involvement of other political actors in Gaza, especially its Qatari, Turkish, and Iranian rivals.

Main Challenges for Israel

Israel has considerable influence on the Palestinian system. Its actions indicate that in practice, it has chosen to
weaken the Palestinian Authority and to raise doubts about its being a “partner” for an agreement, although the PA
maintains security coordination with Israel and allows the IDF operational freedom in the West Bank. The approach
of the Israeli government over the past decade has been to play for time and thereby postpone the establishment
of a Palestinian state as long as possible. With an idea that “time is on Israel‘s side” in the Palestinian arena, the
aim of the policy – in the absence of an alternative – is to maintain Hamas as a weakened political entity that both
restrains rogue actors and is restrained from a large-scale attack. In practice, Israel’s conflict management policy
requires differentiating Gaza from the West Bank, thus working tacitly to prevent the advancement of reconciliation
between the PA and Hamas. This strategy of entrenching division between the sub-systems could lead to increased
chaos, especially if the situation destabilizes after Abbas’s departure and if the fundamental problems of the Gaza
Strip worsen.

This is a difficult time for the Palestinian national idea. On the one hand, the PA continues to adhere to the two-state
solution, while on the other hand, among young Palestinians, there are more and more voices calling for setting
new priorities that focus on abandoning the principle of two states and instead adopt the idea of a “state of all its
citizens” that grants equal civil rights for Palestinians in the State of Israel. These voices could strengthen following
the realization of one or more of the following scenarios: if the Palestinian Authority finds itself succumbing to
infighting on Abbas’s succession or falls into a severe economic and humanitarian crisis; if Israel pursues annexation

40 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL