Page 54 - INSS | 2019-2020

Changes in the IDF and the Debate over “Decision” and “Victory”

In recent decades, changes have also occurred in the IDF’s operational concept and in Israeli thinking on war. Since
the 1990s, Israel has preferred to use its firepower over use of ground forces. This became clear in the Second
Lebanon War, when Israel was very reluctant to use maneuvering ground forces. While ground forces were used in
the operations in Gaza (Operation Cast Lead in late 2008-early 2009 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014), the way
they were used also reflected this trend.

There are a number of reasons for this process, which is also connected to new possibilities afforded by technology.
However, the main factors are apparently social and political constraints that developed over the past few decades,
and particularly the change in Israeli society’s attitude toward war and its costs.

For several decades, there has been a debate in the IDF on questions connected to the current meaning of “military
decision” and “victory,” and the way they can be realized in the contemporary era with an up-to-date operational
doctrine. At the base of these discussions is the question of whether a clear, unequivocal decisive victory, which
seemingly characterized the wars of the past, is possible in current wars. The IDF Strategy (2018) and Chief of Staff Lt.
Gen. Aviv Kochavi’s declared modes of operation (“a lethal, effective, and innovative military”) give a positive answer
to this, and rightly so. They describe the current operational doctrine for war as based on a lethal multidimensional
strike that simultaneously includes precise fire (against thousands of planned and opportune targets) and quick
and flexible ground maneuvering that is meant to penetrate enemy territory toward targets that it sees as having
value, and bring about the enemy’s defeat.

While similar texts were composed in the past, in practice, in all of the most recent clashes, Israel has preferred to
exercise its firepower using the air force and artillery. This emphasis on firepower (based on precise intelligence)
is correct, but it is absolutely clear that the IDF must also have significant maneuvering capabilities to serve as a
central component of defeating the enemy in the case of war. In the IDF’s new multi-year plan, it should therefore
be ensured that the military has this capability to counter enemies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the ability to
cope with the years-long process of social and political pressures that constrain the army’s exercise of force.

Confidence in the IDF

The Israeli public has much confidence in the military and in the security establishment, especially on issues that
are considered professional and operational (such as combat preparedness). In contrast, there is disagreement on
attitudes toward the IDF, particularly regarding issues related to values and ideologies, such as the integration of
women, religion and the army, and even the rules of engagement. In light of the characteristics of the current period
and the intensification of ideological and political arguments in Israeli society, it is at times difficult to distinguish
between professional-operational issues and issues related to values, ideologies, and even politics. This difficulty
could undermine the public’s overall confidence in the IDF.

Another challenge for the public’s confidence could relate to the results of a large-scale military conflict. The image
of a clear and unequivocal victory in a short, fast war has succeeded in surviving over time, and still heavily shapes
the way the Israeli public judges the war and its results. In this state of affairs, the complexity and challenges of the
current conflicts are joined by ongoing frustration with the clear gap between image and reality. The characteristics
of future conflicts could intensify this gap.

Israeli society understands that in war there are casualties among soldiers and on the home front, but it is doubtful
whether the public is currently psychologically prepared for a reality of large-scale destruction in the cities. In this
context, it seems that a relatively large number of rockets and missiles with heavy warheads striking population
centers could cause severe, long term damage to the Israeli public’s sense of security.

52 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL