Page 41 - INSS | 2019-2020

Collapse of the Palestinian Authority and the strengthening of tribal-clan foundations and regional leadership
in its stead (low probability)

R ise of a political alternative to the existing leadership. This scenario is extremely unlikely, although there are
signs of some of the public looking for a new path

The succession issue, as well as the leadership’s loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, has led Abbas and his
associates to promote elections in the coming months in two stages, first for the Legislative Council, according to
the proportional system, and then for the presidency. Hamas and the other factions have expressed agreement in
principle for the idea of elections, but they oppose the election law (amended by Abbas in 2007), which conditions
holding elections on recognizing the PLO and the agreements it has signed. It appears that the sides will engage in
a “blame game” in order to ascribe responsibility for not holding the elections to the other side. In any case, Hamas
will likely continue to try to take over PA institutions and penetrate the ranks of the PLO, and then exploit Abbas’s
departure to demand partnership in the Palestinian leadership and deepen its influence in the West Bank. Israel has
the ability to minimize damage by obstructing Hamas in the West Bank and even to promote opportunities following
Abbas’s departure, as long as it does not “crown” the next leader, but aids in strengthening the leadership that is
elected by the Fatah apparatus or in general elections.

Hamas in the Gaza Strip

Hamas is torn between its
responsibility for governing
the Gaza Strip and its identity
as a resistance movement,
and in this context faces
challenges on three levels.
The first is that Hamas itself
is divided into groups that
disagree on fundamental
questions, e.g., support
for ties with Egypt versus
support for Iran; and support
for a limited arrangement
with Israel on a ceasefire,
versus support for armed
resistance. Consequently, the REUTERS / Suhaib Salem
leadership has difficulty ruling
and undertaking significant Rockets launched by Islamic Jihad from the Gaza Strip to Israel, November 2019.
measures. The second level is Between escalation and arrangement; between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
the difficulty or unwillingness to
restrain the other resistance organizations in Gaza forcibly (the “rogue” organizations), which are affected by other
interests. The third level is that Hamas is the target of increased popular criticism for incompetent governance.
Nonetheless, in 2019, Hamas demonstrated an ability to suppress social protests effectively, and to direct the rage
toward Israel.

Since March 2018, the Gaza Strip has been close to a flare-up, even though Israel and Hamas are not interested in
escalation. The Hamas leadership in Gaza has presented Israel with an ultimatum of escalation or arrangement;
this enabled the limited arrangement with Israel that includes Qatari money coming into Gaza, in exchange for a
commitment to reduce the “popular resistance” along the fence. In tandem, Hamas leaders are tightening their
military deterrence against Israel – the organization launches rocket fire in response to Israeli military activity and
mainly as a tool to pressure Israel in negotiations, in order to ease the civilian situation in Gaza.

THE PALESTINIAN SYSTEM 39