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and its proxies. But this policy also led to informal recognition of the Assad regime as the victor in the civil war. The
ongoing campaign and Israel’s damage capability can lay the groundwork for a complementary political process
that could remove Iranian capabilities that threaten Israel from Syria, whether via Russian pressure on Iran or via
President Assad’s understanding that the Iranian activity in Syria exacts too great a toll.

The killing of Soleimani sparked a reinforcement of US forces in the region. However, this might be a prelude to an
accelerated withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and eastern Syria. A development of this sort will grant a victory to US
adversaries in the competition over shaping the Syrian sphere: Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime, which together
will receive a strong grip on northeastern Syria. In addition, it is possible that the Islamic State will reappear, despite
the US operational and moral achievement of assassinating its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Improved Preparedness for War in the Northern Arena is Imperative

The loss of control over the levels of escalation, the increasing confidence of Iran and Hezbollah, and above all, their
increasing number of precision missiles raise the likelihood of a war between Israel and Hezbollah and the Shiite
axis in the northern arena. Israel must decide if a particular number of precision missiles in Hezbollah’s possession
demands a preventive attack to remove or significantly reduce the threat. A successful Israeli attack to prevent the
construction of an arsenal of precision missiles in Lebanon would increase the risk of war.

As part of his risk management, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah estimates that the organization’s actions in
Lebanon enjoy “immunity,” based on the mutual deterrence with Israel since 2006. According to the equation that
has developed, if Hezbollah does not attack Israel from Lebanon, then Israel will not attack in Lebanon. Based on this
working assumption, Hezbollah advanced the missile conversion project together with Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Quds Force commander Soleimani, and over the course of a decade dug attack tunnels (exposed and neutralized by
Israel in Operation Northern Shield). Nasrallah is wary of war, given his familiarity with Israel’s capabilities, as well
as due to the organization’s internal and economic difficulties and Lebanon’s unstable situation. The organization
is torn between its increasing responsibility for the Lebanese state and its commitment to its patron (Iran) and its
commitment to respond to Israeli attacks in Lebanon and perhaps even to serious attacks on Iranian forces in Syria.

It will be difficult to limit the next war to the Lebanese front, and it is likely that it will unfold on several fronts at
once: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and possibly Iran itself. Israel’s security cabinet decided this year to strengthen Israel’s
defense capabilities, especially against missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks. In practice, Israel must also
strengthen the preparedness of the home front, improve its defense ability and the means of protection, and reinforce
the pillars of civilian resilience in communities in the north. In tandem, the political-economic-cognitive effort to
weaken Hezbollah (which bore fruit over the past year with the sanctions on Iran, the recognition of Hezbollah as
a terrorist organization by a greater number of states, and the civil unrest in Lebanon) must be maintained, even
though it may undermine the performance of the Lebanese state.

Coordination with the World Powers

Israel should continue its close relations and coordination with both world powers relevant to the Syrian context
– Russia and the United States. Russia has an interest in reducing long term Iranian influence in Syria, but it does
not want and cannot remove it from Syria due to the complexity of the strategic relations between the countries
on other levels. However, given its increasing influence on the reconstruction of the Syrian army, Moscow has the

ability to at least slow the construction of the Iranian war machine in Syria,
which depends on Syrian national and military systems and infrastructure.
Coordination with Russia is also essential for maintaining Israel’s freedom of
operation, preventing military friction, and formulating a shared picture of
the challenges before them. Israel must continue to place political pressure
on Russian President Putin in order to prevent the supply of advanced air
defense systems to the Assad regime, especially as long as he enables Iran’s
buildup in his territory.

34 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL