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Despite the US desire to withdraw its forces from northeastern Syria, Israel must continue its attempts to include
the United States in the process of crafting an arrangement in Syria, and to cultivate an American commitment to
block the Shiite supply axis between Iraq and Syria (and Lebanon). The United States is expected to continue to
provide political backing to Israel (on the condition that Israel not entangle it in conflicts in Iraq and in eastern Syria)
but will refrain from getting drawn into another war in the Middle East. Consequently, Israel and the United States
would do well to consider a Russian offer of removing Iranian capabilities that threaten Israel from Syria, in return
for the easing of American sanctions on Russia and on Iran. Such an arrangement could be feasible if a formula is
created for returning Iran to negotiations on an updated nuclear deal (JCPOA), which includes a reduction of its
intervention in the region.

The Israeli interest is to strive to develop a broad group of partners for preventing the consolidation of the Shiite-
Iranian axis from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea. Aside from the United States, potential partners are the Sunni
Arab states and European states. Part of the process should also include strengthening control of the border
crossings between Syria and Lebanon – which would restrict the Iranians and Hezbollah, and at the same time (at
least ostensibly) strengthen Lebanese sovereignty. An alternative plan for Syria’s reconstruction led by the West and
the Sunni Arab states should be prepared, rather than leaving the reconstruction to Iran by default. Israel can also
take part in such an effort and, via a third party, direct investments toward southern Syria, especially the Quneitra
and Daraa governorates on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights.

Conclusion

It has become clear that the assessments that Assad defeated his opponents were premature, and the civil war in
Syria is expected to continue at a low intensity. Iran will use the struggles among the internal and external actors to
continue its buildup in Syria, and Salafi-jihadist elements may likewise exploit the situation for their own revitalization.
The economic and humanitarian crisis will continue for the lack of a Western element that is willing to invest in Syria
while Iran is involved and Assad remains in power. All of the relevant actors will have difficulty formulating a political
settlement and implementing governmental reform in Syria, certainly one that would end Assad’s rule.

The winds of war in the northern arena are blowing stronger than in previous years. Israel could lose two of its
prominent advantages: first, its ability to operate freely against the construction of the Iranian war machine in Syria,
without risk of escalation; and second, the knowledge that the United States would stand with Israel and block the
Shiite supply axis from Iran via Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. Consequently, Israel must formulate an updated plan
for the ongoing campaign against Iranian consolidation in the northern arena, and at the same time, prepare for a
multi-theater military challenge that it might face alone.

The next Israeli government faces four serious strategic decisions:

The first involves the set of responses to an Iranian attack on military and national infrastructure deep within
Israel using cruise missiles, high trajectory weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

The second considers whether to change the policy toward the Assad regime and see it as responsible for
developments in Syria, including the Iranian involvement.

The third debates whether there is a red line regarding Hezbollah’s
precision missile stockpile that would demand an Israeli preemptive
strike to remove the threat to the home front under conditions that are
more favorable to Israel than postponement of the war to an unknown
time in the future.

T he fourth examines how to intensify the campaign against Iran’s influence
in Iraq while leveraging the effect of Soleimani’s killing and the close
coordination with the United States.

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