Page 53 - INSS | 2019-2020

and Syria) to arm themselves heavily with ballistic weapons (missiles and
rockets) and with advanced anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles; to acquire
and develop advanced air defense systems; to adopt combat methods that
emphasize concealment, defense, the dispersion of fighting forces, reduced
signature, and hiding in a civilian environment and civilian facilities; and even
to embrace the efforts of states such as Iran and Syria to arm themselves
with chemical and nuclear weapons.

The confrontations since the Second Lebanon War (2006) have illustrated
to Israel’s enemies that this doctrine has, in many senses, reached a dead
end. While it has succeeded in establishing deterrence against Israel and has
led to Israel’s inability to defeat them decisively and unequivocally, clashes
where Israel exercised intensive military strength have entailed severe costs
for its enemies, and have reflected the limitations of the doctrine and their
means to implement it. These results were among the factors that led to the strengthening of Israeli deterrence and
to the long periods of quiet on the Lebanese border since the Second Lebanon War, and on the border with Gaza (in
the three and a half years following Operation Protective Edge, and to a large extent afterwards as well).

The last few years reflect an attempt by Israel’s enemies to formulate and implement an improved and updated
military doctrine using additional elements: increased numbers of rockets and missiles, both in order to improve
organizational survivability and to saturate Israel’s air defense systems; high precision-guided rockets and missiles
that can hit vulnerable civilian sites (electric, gas, and other national infrastructure) and vulnerable military sites (air
force bases and military HQ locations); drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles, also for the purpose of precision
strikes; improved air defense measures in order to neutralize the impact of Israel’s air force, given its central role
in Israel’s military doctrine; improvements in coastal defense systems and naval warfare; development of cyber
capabilities; and plans for operating ground forces in Israeli territory, including via attack tunnels (some of which
were exposed and neutralized this year), in order to disrupt the IDF’s offensive and defensive capabilities and to
increase the damage to the stamina of the Israeli home front.

These military buildup efforts are apparently connected to a more fundamental change underway in the military
thought of those identified with the radical Shiite axis. This change leads them from a victory doctrine based on
attrition of the Israeli population (“victory by non-defeat”) to a different doctrine that also seeks to damage Israeli
national infrastructure and essential military capabilities from different arenas, in order to throw the Israeli system
off balance.

The Characteristics of the Next War

The theater in which this concept is most evident is the northern arena, where the IDF is preparing for two main
scenarios: a “Third Lebanon War” against only Hezbollah in Lebanon, which will be much more intense and destructive
than the Second Lebanon War; and a “First Northern War” with Hezbollah in Lebanon and forces in Syria and Iraq,
and perhaps also Iran and other arenas. The multi-front scenario of a “First Northern War” could also include clashes
with forces in the Gaza Strip.

In both scenarios, Israel will likely face massive surface-to-surface missile fire at the home front, some precise and some
that will succeed in penetrating the air defense systems; attacks on the home front from unmanned aerial vehicles
and drones; the penetration of ground forces into Israeli territory on a scale of thousands of fighters; and a large
scale cognitive warfare campaign to undermine the public’s stamina and its confidence in the political and military
leadership. The IDF’s offensive component – on the ground, in the air, and at sea – will face more sophisticated air
and naval defense systems and complex ground defense systems that also include the use of subterranean warfare
and advanced anti-tank missiles.

Such a war, therefore, involves the possibility of serious damage to the IDF’s basic capabilities such as the air force,
air defense, intelligence, logistics, and reserve recruitment system. Essential national infrastructure might also be
damaged, and there could be destruction and death in Israel’s cities.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 51