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Global Disorder

At the outset of the third decade of the 21st century, it is clear that the world order is characterized primarily by
disorder. The main actors in the international system are still states, led by the world powers (United States, China,
and Russia), but the weight of non-state actors (technology and globalization giants, terrorist organizations, and
independent actors) has increased. Economic anxiety is evident everywhere and inter alia leads to what seems to
be a popular revolt against the elite and against globalization (as well as to trade wars). The world is networked
in a way that enables the transfer of ideas more quickly, and local social and cultural phenomena become global.
Events that in the past were considered inconceivable occur more frequently. Meanwhile, the influence of populist
politicians has increased; they mobilize general public support through simple, catchy messages that appeal to the
public’s emotions and the presentation of “alternative facts” that serve their interests.

The International System: Superpower Competition and Functional Difficulties

The first chapter of the Strategic Survey discusses the international system, which suffers from functional difficulties
against the background of strategic competition between the world powers and their respective domestic challenges.
The Western actors are eager for the Middle East to be less of a priority for them due to the rising importance of East
Asia, the fear of military entanglement, and changes in the energy market. However, unfolding developments seem
to obstruct this objective.

The United States remains the strongest world power in terms of resources and capabilities, but under the leadership
of President Trump, it has turned inward to focus more on narrow national interests. It embarks on a turbulent
election year that will take place in the shadow of the impeachment proceedings. The attack on Americans and
American symbols (e.g., the embassy in Iraq) led the United States to kill Soleimani and to strengthen its posture
in the area. Still, it does not appear that the US intends to reach a broad confrontation with Iran.

R ussia is partially though forcefully filling the vacuums left by United States policy in the Middle East. However,
Putin, Russia’s veteran president, is coping with domestic challenges that stem in part from public fatigue with
international dramas. This strengthens those who seek to display a more pragmatic approach toward the West
and to make the most of détente processes.

C hina is leveraging its economic power toward political influence and increased military power, but its growth
rate has slowed and it too is coping with challenges to its internal stability, which lead it to allocate resources to
tighten its control within the domestic arena. China is active in the Middle East, but its interests focus mainly on
the economic sphere, along with symbolic political activity and initial indications of a military presence.

E urope’s stability is undermined by expanding economic gaps, challenges of refugees and migration, the
strengthening of extremists on the right and left, and the intensifying debate between the supporters of the Union
and those who support nationalism. In addition, there are changes in the intra-European balance of power (in
anticipation of the end of the Merkel era) and increasing understanding of the need to reduce the military and
economic dependence on the United States.

The targeted killing of Soleimani serves Israeli interests, at least in the short run, and underscores the need for Israel’s
strategic coordination with the United States. Nonetheless, Israel will apparently have to contend with most of the
regional challenges alone. In addition, there are risks of a clash with the US in several areas: relations with China,
the (albeit unlikely) potential for a future agreement with Iran, channels of dialogue with Russia, and the crisis of
relations between the current Israeli leadership and the Democratic Party in the United States, especially if the
Democrats return to the White House. At the same time, the strategic competition between the world powers is also
an opportunity for Israel, which should shape policy based on cooperation with the United States (perhaps even
establishing a “strategic innovation alliance”), while deepening its entry into growing markets and strengthening
relations with Europe. All of these require careful management of risks to Israel’s strategic relations with the world
powers, and in particular, dialogue and coordination with all of the relevant bodies within the United States: the
administration, the public, the media, and American Jewry.

2020 STRATEGIC OVERVIEW 3