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The Northern Arena: Toward a Large-Scale Conflict

The fourth chapter discusses the northern arena, which poses the most significant conventional military threat to
Israel. This threat comes from Iran and its proxies: first and foremost Hezbollah in Lebanon; the Assad regime and
paramilitary forces active in Syria and Iraq under Iranian guidance; and Iranian forces (as well as Hezbollah forces)
active in the Syrian sphere. In Syria, advanced Russian operational capabilities are also deployed, which could – if
Russia so decides – significantly restrict Israel’s freedom of operation in Lebanon and Syria.

Israel’s strategy in this arena in recent years has become known as the “campaign between wars.” A correct analysis
of the situation in different arenas led the political leadership and the senior military leadership to an assessment
that proper management of the risks of escalation could enable Israel to exercise force in order to reduce existing
and emerging threats, without leading to a large-scale conflict, which Israel does not want.

This sound assessment prompted ongoing, bold, and imaginative operational activity that since 2013 has included
hundreds of strikes on a series of targets in Syrian territory and in additional theaters. This activity was directed
primarily against the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, and during the past two years, likewise against
Iran’s military buildup efforts in Syria and its efforts to create a land bridge from Iran via Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.
During the course of 2019, it became clear that Iraq’s territory is also used by Iran as a possible platform for attacking
Israel with missiles.

A broad examination of this Israeli strategy shows that it has scored important achievements. While it has not led to
the removal of Iranian forces from Syria (and it likely did not aim at this ambitious objective in the first place), there
are signs that the rate of Iran’s buildup has slowed, and the nature of the deployment may also have been influenced
by Israel’s actions. The effort to prevent the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah has not succeeded completely, but it
seems that it slowed the activity and prevented massive arming with certain qualitative weapons. Yet after seven
years, it appears that a confluence of factors has led to a situation where the value of the current Israeli strategy
has reached its peak, is coping with an overload of risks, and could lead to a large-scale conflict and even to war.

Hezbollah is still deterred and restrained, but is determined to maintain red lines vis-à-vis Israel (preventing attacks
in Lebanese territory, and apparently also fatalities among members of the organization in Syria) and to convert a
large number of missiles and rockets in its possession into precision weapons.

Transferring the center of gravity of activity surrounding the precision missile project from Syria to Lebanon
highlights the challenge Israel is facing. The risks of escalation were illustrated clearly by events in late August and
early September 2019, particularly had Israelis been killed by the anti-tank missiles fired by Hezbollah. Such an
escalation, if it deteriorates into an all-out war, could be realized in two main scenarios: a “Third Lebanon War” with
only Hezbollah in Lebanon, which would be much more intense and destructive than the Second Lebanon War; and
a “First Northern War” against Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as against forces in Syria and Iraq, and perhaps even
Iran and additional states. Escalation could also develop if Iran attacks Israeli targets in response to the killing of
Soleimani. In these scenarios, Israel is expected to face massive surface-to-surface missile fire on the home front,
some of which would be precision-guided missiles; the attempt to infiltrate ground forces into its territory; and a
broad cognitive attack to undermine the public’s stamina and its confidence in the political and military leadership.

The risks of escalation also require Israel to carry out a more fundamental discussion on the overall benefits and
risks of the efforts to prevent the enemy’s conventional buildup processes (as opposed to nuclear buildup efforts,
where there is broad agreement that force should be used to prevent them, as per the Begin Doctrine). With respect
to the precision missile project, the discussion should weigh the possible damage from the use of precision weapons
versus the possibilities (defensive and offensive) for taking action against it. In this framework, an in-depth discussion
should also take place on the idea of a preventive attack on Hezbollah and the right timing for such a strike, in the
face of progress in the precision project.

2020 STRATEGIC OVERVIEW 7