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project. For Israel in 2020, the main implication is the shortened amount of time
needed for Iran to break out to nuclear weapons, if it decides to do so. Trump’s
political situation and the nature of his conduct in an election year pose an
additional risk for Israel – the possibility of a breakthrough in negotiations on a
new nuclear deal that would be presented ostensibly as an improved agreement,
but would not further Israel’s interests. Particularly in light of Soleimani’s killing,
however, the prospects of this development are slim.
According to a number of indicators, it appears that notwithstanding its continued
difficult economic situation, the Iranian economy is in a process of stabilization
and adaptation to the sanctions regime. However, these macroeconomic figures
have not improved the lives of the citizens who joined widespread violent public
protests in November, which focused on the economic issue and highlighted the
antipathy toward the regime. As in the past, the regime succeeded in suppressing
the protests, using repressive measures that exacted a heavy toll in lives (with
hundreds killed) and making extensive arrests.
The central challenge for Israel vis-à-vis Iran in the coming year is to formulate a strategy that enables the use of force
in different arenas and different dimensions, without leading to a large-scale clash with Iran or to war in Lebanon,
while maintaining close coordination with the United States. At the same time, Israel must develop a credible option
of exercising direct force against Iran, and formulate understandings with the United States on three problematic
scenarios: the first is the reopening of negotiations between the United States and Iran, which could end up leaving Iran
with the ability to enrich uranium, without a substantial Iranian concession in return; the second is military escalation
between Israel and Iran; and the third is progress in Iran’s nuclear program, while it continues to accumulate fissile
material and reach higher enrichment levels, which would lead to a significant reduction in the time required for a
potential breakout to nuclear weapons. On these three central issues, gaps could develop between Israel’s interests
and those of the United States, and of President Trump in particular.

Official President’s website/Handout via REUTERS

Iranian leaders by the coffin of Soleimani in Tehran. The targeted killing of Soleimani creates a new context and might become
a strategic turning point.

6 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL