Page 10 - INSS | 2019-2020

Ways to Address the Precision Missile Project

Continue the campaign between wars – increased activity to expose and attack the “precision project” as part of
the campaign between wars (in a variety of arenas). However, the effectiveness of this possibility is limited, and
could lead to unintended escalation.

D efense – basing the response on active defense capabilities (air defense systems) and passive capabilities
(shielding). This option cannot provide a complete response, given the range and scope of enemy capabilities.

D eterrence – basing the response on Israel’s deterrence capabilities and grounding them in a clear and explicit
threat regarding the implications of using precision weapons. However, this possibility involves much uncertainty,
and the number of precision missiles can neutralize the deterrence, which depends to a great extent on the context
and circumstances of the conflict.

P reemptive strike – basing the response on a large-scale strike on the precision weapon system and its production
infrastructure at the start of a war, before it is used. However, this option involves much uncertainty, and depends
on precise intelligence and additional factors.

P reventive attack – launching a proactive surprise attack on Hezbollah, at a time that is optimal for Israel. However,
the results of such an attack, which could well lead to war (with a high likelihood of a “First Northern War”), could
be difficult for Israel.

The Palestinian System: Weakened and Close to Escalation

The fifth chapter discusses the Palestinian system, which is divided into two
sub-systems – the Palestinian Authority, which rules the West Bank, and Hamas,
which rules the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government's strategy over the past
decade of managing the conflict has sought to obstruct the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank. Regarding the Gaza Strip, Israel (lacking an
alternative) has acted in effect to maintain Hamas as a political entity – albeit
weakened – that both restrains rogue actors and is restrained from large-scale
attack. In practice, Israel's policy of differentiation of Gaza from the West Bank
works against reconciliation between the PA and Hamas.

The immediate objectives of the Palestinian Authority are survival, consolidation
of Fatah's rule, and guarantee of Abbas's legacy. Fatah, which leads the PA, is
the target of harsh criticism and is currently on the horns of a dilemma – how to
progress toward its goals without losing the achievements it has scored since the
Oslo Accords. While from time to time senior figures threaten to dismantle the
PA and "return the keys" to Israel, in practice it appears that the PA is wary of such a move. Coordination between the
PA security forces and the IDF continues, in accordance with the PA's interest in preventing an outbreak of violence
and in light of Abbas's consistent rejection of the path of terrorism. This is despite polls showing increasing support
among the Palestinian public for violent struggle. Meantime, the Palestinian issue is gradually losing its centrality
in regional and international discourse.

Beneath the surface, competition is underway for Palestinian leadership on the day after Abbas. Hamas will likely
continue to try to take over PA institutions and penetrate the ranks of the PLO, and then exploit Abbas's departure
to deepen its influence in the West Bank. Israel has the ability to minimize damage and even promote opportunities

8 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL