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The Four Middle East Camps Pragmatic Sunni

Radical Shiite Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, United Arab Emirates,
Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Houthis in and most Gulf states
Yemen, Shiite militias, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad

Muslim Brotherhood Salafi-Jihadist

Turkey, Qatar, Hamas, remnants Islamic State (ISIS),
of the Muslim Brotherhood in al-Qaeda
other states

Iran: Defiance and Audacity, alongside Internal Challenges

The third chapter deals with Iran, which leads the radical Shiite axis and poses the most severe threat to Israel’s
security. Among the region’s camps, this camp is the most organized and cohesive, uses a variety of political and
military means of influence, operates in many arenas, and is progressing in its efforts to create a different, pro-Iranian,
and anti-Western regional order.

2019 was marked by Iranian audacity on the nuclear issue and in regional activity, and over the year the confrontation
with the United States intensified. In the first year after the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018,
Iran abided by its obligations according to the agreement, but in 2019 its policy changed and it began, carefully and
gradually, to stray from these commitments. In addition, Iran undertook provocative military activity in the Middle
East against United States allies, marked especially by the attack on the oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and against the
United States itself, in shooting down the American drone and directing its proxies in Iraq to attack United States bases
and storm the embassy in Baghdad. Since 2018, Iran and Israel have also been in a direct but limited confrontation,
which this year saw Iranian casualties in Syria.

In tandem, Iran continued its military buildup in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, with the goal of deepening its
influence, reducing American influence, and creating bases for potential activity to attack Israel and Saudi Arabia.
For such activity, Iran depends on local forces that enable its freedom of operation (military and other) – first and
foremost Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime, along with the pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Syria, Iraq, and
Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. In the Palestinian arena, Iranian support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas continues,
manifested in funding and in technological knowledge for rocket and missile production and additional weapons.

Following the killing of Soleimani, Iran chose a limited response that would not lead to a full-scale conflict with
the United States. It was Soleimani himself who had coordinated the analysis and planning of actions of this sort
in the region, and controlled Iran’s ties to its proxies in the area. In addition, Iran was confronted with a domestic
crisis following the downing of the Ukrainian plane. Nonetheless, it is too early to assess how Soleimani’s death will
affect the determination and brazenness of Iran as it was manifest in the latter months of 2019, led by its capabilities
against Israel and Hezbollah’s precision missile project.

On the nuclear issue, the sides have reached a dead end: the United States has no long term strategy other than
continuing the economic sanctions and striving for a deal whose parameters have not been defined. The Europeans
are worried about escalation and prefer to define Iran’s defiant actions as minor; and Iran itself does not intend to
return to negotiations if its demands regarding the sanctions are not met, and it continues to advance its nuclear

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