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military activity in the Middle East against United States allies, marked especially by the attack on the oil facilities in
Saudi Arabia, and against the United States itself, which began with shooting down the American UAV and led to the
attack on American citizens (including one fatality) and charging the embassy in Iraq, which prompted the string of
responses that led to the targeted killing of Soleimani.

The Nuclear Program

In the face of the “maximum pressure” policy that the United states has adopted since May 2018, which in practice
has mainly taken the form of economic measures (sanctions) and political measures (diplomatic pressure), Iran
employs a policy of “maximum resistance,” which reflects its assessment that it can withstand the economic toll
taken by the sanctions. In response to President Trump, who repeatedly emphasizes his desire for negotiations
that would lead to a new agreement, the Iranian leadership insists that it will not return to negotiations without the
compensation it was entitled to according to the agreement, and even then would only do so within the multilateral
framework of the P5+1.

Concurrently, Iran is working to advance its nuclear program – with steps that began in limited and measured
fashion, but have intensified with time – and is incurring additional risks while pursuing military action in the Gulf.
The goal is to harm Washington’s principal allies in the region and the global oil market, and illustrate the costs
of the American policy toward Iran. On the other hand, Iran continues to maintain its connections with European
states, while emphasizing its willingness to return to the nuclear agreement if the sanctions are lifted. Thus, it leaves
open the possibility of continuing the diplomatic talks to foster ties with the United States. Relations with Russia
are also maintained and strengthened based on shared interests in Syria that oppose those of the United States; in
this sense, Israeli hopes of driving a wedge between Moscow and Tehran have not borne fruit, despite the existing
gaps between them.

Therefore, on the nuclear issue, the sides have reached a dead end: the United States has no long term strategy other
than continuing the economic sanctions as a tool for changing Iranian policy (without the intention to change the
current regime) and bringing Iran back to the negotiating table; the Europeans are worried about escalation and
prefer to define Iran’s defiant actions as minor; and the Iranians themselves do not intend to return to negotiations
if their demands regarding the sanctions are not met, and they continue to move forward with the nuclear project.

Consequently, 2020 will likely be marked by continued Iranian challenges that will include escalating steps in the
nuclear program. Prospects for renewed negotiations between Iran and the United States, though slim, largely
depend on President Trump’s willingness to relax the sanctions. The main significance of this for Israel in 2020 is Iran’s
continued uranium enrichment and accumulation of fissile material (low level at this stage), continued progress on
advanced centrifuges, possible escalatory actions in relation to enrichment levels, and perhaps even a reduction in
IAEA inspection arrangements. This situation would shorten the amount of time needed to progress toward nuclear
weapons, if Iran decides to do so.

THAIER AL-SUDANI

IR-40 heavy water research reactor, near Arak. Still not in violation of the nuclear agreement.

IRAN 27