Page 30 - INSS | 2019-2020

How Iran Violates the JCPOA, January 2020

Subject Commitment Violation Significance

Uranium Up to 3.67% Up to approximately 4.5% Still low level and insignificant.
enrichment level in Natanz and Fordow Reversible measure
Up to 300 kg UF6
Enriched (or equivalent of More than 300 kg Shortened time to a military
uranium stockpiles other chemical material) breakout. Reversible measure
Approximately 131 tons
Heavy water Up to 130 tons Minor violation.
stockpiles Reversible measure

Advanced In years 1-8, testing of limited Injection of gas into 11 IR-6 Technological progress. Increase
centrifuges number of IR-6 centrifuges centrifuges, and installation of 33 in amount of enriched material
(10-20); in years 8-10, – depending on success of tests.
Uranium tests on 30 centrifuges additional IR-6 centrifuges
enrichment site Irreversible measure

in Fordow Enrichment prohibited; Uranium enrichment Significant reduction of time
use permitted only as to level of about 4.5% to military nuclear breakout.
a research and production (more than 3.67%)
center for stable isotopes Reversible measure

Regional Activity

In 2019, Iran continued its military buildup in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, in order to deepen its influence, reduce
American influence, and establish bases for potential activity to harm Israel and Saudi Arabia as part of creating
deterrence. For this activity, Iran depends on local elements that enable its freedom of action (not only military) – first
and foremost Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime, as well as pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq and Lebanon
and the Houthis in Yemen. In the Palestinian arena too, Iranian support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas continues,
manifested in funding and in technological knowledge for rocket and missile production.

Iraq is a strategic asset for Tehran – given its long shared border with Iran, its position as a land and air bridge to Syria
and Lebanon, the Shiite holy sites in Najaf and Karbala, and the historic connections between parts of the Shiite
community and groups in Iran. This background in part drives Iran’s desire to continue to undermine the American
influence in Iraq and end the American presence there. However, increasing public criticism of the Iraqi government
over its identification with Iran has sparked unrest that threatens to harm Tehran’s achievements, which are based
on special efforts to create economic, cultural, religious, and security influence in Iraq. The anti-American sentiments
that infuse the protests in Iraq and the danger that these protests pose to Iranian interests strengthen the resolve of
Tehran and the Shiite militias to bring these protests to an end.

The killing of Soleimani will not prompt any substantive change in Iran’s overall regional strategy, but it does
challenge Tehran’s ability to achieve its objectives. Consequently, Iran and the United States are weighing their next
steps. Iran’s dilemma lies between the need to respond forcefully (directly or through its proxies) against American
targets and the fear of a powerful American counter-response. Therefore, action against United States allies in the
region is also possible.

Syria has become a focus of unusual Iranian military activity, against the backdrop of the war that threatened to
eliminate the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s important ally. The Iranian presence has created severe friction with
Israel, which has increased its military activity to undermine Iran’s military buildup. The Syrian theater will continue

28 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL