Page 34 - INSS | 2019-2020

principal efforts: Hezbollah’s precision missile project in Lebanon and that of Iran in Syria; and Iranian moves to
establish a land bridge from Iran through Iraq and Syria. During 2019 it became clear that Iraqi territory is also used
by Iran as a possible platform to attack Israel with missiles.

Pavel Golovkin / Pool via REUTERS

L-r: Presidents Putin, Rouhani, and Erdogan in Ankara, September 2019. There is little likelihood of Russia pushing Iran out Syria in 2020.

Principal Trends and Expectations for 2020

Syria is still far from functioning as a unified state. President Bashar al-Assad remains in power, but he is entirely
dependent on Iran, Russia, internal security apparatuses, the army, militias, and criminal elements. In his eyes, the
survival of his regime is paramount: he strives to establish a political and military order that is similar to what existed
before the civil war; prefers to invest in rebuilding the army rather than rebuilding the state’s infrastructures; will
continue to engage in demographic “cleansing” by removing or weakening unwanted (especially disloyal) populations
and preventing the return of refugees; and will maintain his chemical warfare capabilities. The Syrian army is being
rebuilt under Russian influence with Iranian involvement, with an emphasis on air defense, high trajectory fire
including precision missiles, high mobility, and special forces.
It is too early to assess how the killing of Soleimani will impact on Iran’s regional activity. Iran is expected to continue
to exploit Assad’s weakness in order to consolidate its multidimensional influence in Syria: build the war machine in
the theater and strengthen the Shiite supply axis from Iran via Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. Iran will continue to transfer
advanced missile capabilities to Syria and strengthen the readiness of the militias that are under its authority, which
include tens of thousands of operatives located within the Syrian arena. Some are intended for fighting against
Israel, others for ongoing missions to retain territory in the area, along with upgrading and reinforcing Hezbollah
outposts on the Golan Heights.
Russia is unlikely to push Iran out of Syria in 2020. Its network of interests vis-à-vis Iran is broader, and from its
perspective, Iran has a role to play in stabilizing Assad’s regime. However, it is likely that Moscow will not let Iran
establish itself in Syria in a way that threatens Russian interests – both economic interests and those connected to
the stability of the Assad regime.
In northern and northeastern Syria, it seems it will be difficult to stop Turkey from reinforcing its influence, all the
more so in light of the reduction of the American presence there in late 2019. Turkey conducted a military operation
to construct a 32-kilometer wide safe zone on the Syrian side of the border, in order to create a barrier between the
Kurds and Syria and the Kurds in Turkey. In Ankara’s view, an effective means of creating the barrier is to exploit
the territory to settle Syrian refugees, mainly Sunnis, who fled to its territory, and deploy rebel forces subject to

32 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL