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its authority. As such, it seeks to achieve two goals: reduce the heavy burden of the refugees, and reduce Kurdish
dominance in the area. The immediate response of the Kurds was a willingness to reach an agreement with the Assad
regime with Russian mediation, in return for a guarantee from Russia and the regime of the right to autonomy in
northeastern Syria. In addition, a Russian-Turkish agreement led to a ceasefire and the agreement of Kurdish forces
to withdraw from the border, such that Russian and Turkish forces conduct joint patrols of the territory.

There is only a slim chance in 2020 of seeing governmental reforms in Syria or a viable agreement between the
opposition and the Assad regime sponsored by the countries involved – Russia, Iran, and Turkey – and the greater
international community. Furthermore, it does not appear that there will be budgets or motivation for civilian
reconstruction of Syria. The issue is not a top priority for China, Europe, the United States, or the Sunni states.

In Lebanon, after an extended political deadlock, a new government was formed in early 2019, but it has had difficulty
taking decisions and spearheading improvement in the severe internal situation (deep economic crisis; lack of
infrastructure; unemployment; corruption; and the burdensome presence of Syrian refugees). The increasing distress
of the population, along with the paralysis of the political system, led to the spontaneous outbreak (October 17) of
large-scale popular protests, singular in nature insofar as they did not differentiate between communities and targeted
all of the elements comprising the government (both the Sunni camp led by Prime Minister Hariri, who resigned, and

the Christian-Shiite camp, which includes President Aoun and Hezbollah as a
political movement). The demonstrators demand substantive change in the
political system and the leadership and elimination of government corruption.
Hezbollah is not interested in change because the current system serves its
interests; in any case, in different scenarios Hezbollah would likely retain its
independence and its increasing influence on decision making processes in
Lebanon. It thus remains possible that the Lebanese system could collapse
and even deteriorate into another civil war.

Significance and Recommendations for Israel

Israel can point to many operational achievements in recent years in the northern arena, due to intensive offensive
activity with an impressive level of operational efficiency in the campaign between wars, which has allowed Israel
to avoid war. However, on the strategic level, Israel has not prevented Iran’s ongoing consolidation in the northern
arena and construction of its war machine in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

Israel’s Campaign between Wars

In 2020, Iran is expected to further its entrenchment in Syria on social, cultural, economic, and infrastructure levels.
Iran is also developing offensive capabilities for attacking deep into Israel from Syrian territory and possibly also
from Iraqi territory, while adopting rules of the game that are similar to the Israeli campaign between wars. In this
context, Iran’s activity and its high level operational capabilities were evident in the attack on the oil facilities in
Saudi Arabia, and in the attempts to launch rockets and drones toward Israel from Syria. Overall, there is increased
potential for escalation between Israel and Iran and its proxies from the Syrian and Iraqi spheres, particularly
following the killing of Soleimani.

This dynamic highlights the Israeli challenge of waging the “ongoing campaign below the threshold of war” against
Iranian buildup in the northern arena, and the need for coordination with the United States. In 2020, it seems that Israel
will have difficulty controlling the levels of escalation, because the enemy is now familiar with the IDF’s capabilities
and has improved its defense, while developing offensive response capabilities. In addition, to the extent that
stability in Syria is further undermined, Russia could impose limitations on Israel’s freedom of operation in Syrian
airspace. Israel would do well to return to the policy of deliberate ambiguity, employ more covert capabilities, and
refrain from public arrogance regarding its operations in the northern arena.

Israel should reassess its policy of non-intervention in the civil war in Syria. Israel’s ability to damage the Assad regime
served as a means of leverage, especially toward Russia, which enabled it to operate in the Syrian arena against Iran

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