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following Abbas's departure, as long as it does not "crown" the next leader, but aids in strengthening the leadership
that is elected by the Fatah apparatus or in general elections.

Hamas is torn between its responsibility for governing the Gaza Strip and its identity as a resistance movement. Since
March 2018, after three and a half years of relative quiet following Operation Protective Edge, the Gaza Strip has been
close to a flare-up, even though Israel and Hamas are not interested in escalation. The Hamas leadership in Gaza
has presented Israel with a choice of escalation or arrangement; this enabled the limited arrangement with Israel
that includes allowing Qatari money into Gaza, in exchange for a commitment to reduce the "popular resistance"
along the fence. In tandem, Hamas leaders are tightening their military deterrence against Israel – the organization
launches rocket fire in response to Israeli military activity and as a tool to pressure Israel in negotiations, in order
to ease the civilian situation in Gaza. Egypt has a central role in stabilizing Gaza, and it has positioned itself as the
exclusive mediator between Israel and Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The preferred and most feasible alternative to advance Israel’s security interests is a long term ceasefire between
Israel and Hamas reached with Egyptian mediation. A ceasefire of this sort (in the form of an “arrangement”) would
include significantly easing the closure of Gaza and advancing infrastructure projects. If Israel and Hamas do not
reach and implement understandings on an extended ceasefire, the likelihood of a large-scale military conflict in the
Gaza Strip will increase. To be sure, an arrangement following a wide-scale military conflict will allow Israel to attain
a ceasefire from a more advantageous position and with strengthened deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, yet at the cost of
much damage and many losses. Moreover, it is doubtful whether it would give Israel better negotiating conditions
toward an arrangement than what can already be achieved today. Of the alternatives before Israel, there is no means
to prevent military buildup by Hamas or Islamic Jihad over time, but an arrangement enables an improved security
situation in the Gaza perimeter and attention to the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

The consequences of the strategic distress in the Palestinian system do not benefit Israel, and there is increased
likelihood of escalation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, the current situation enables Israel to shape a
more favorable architecture of relations with the Palestinians, even without a comprehensive agreement, promoting
a political, territorial, and demographic separation and an independent and distinct Palestinian entity in the West
Bank. This, along with limited steps on an arrangement in the Gaza Strip, would at least enable postponement of a
future conflict. To this end, Israel must act along two channels:

The first is to strengthen the Palestinian Authority as the sole legitimate entity for a future agreement, and set a
political objective of achieving transitional arrangements that would shape the separation and outline the conditions
for a future reality of two states based on the INSS Plan, A Strategic Framework for the Israeli-Palestinian Arena.

The second is to see Hamas as the entity temporarily responsible for the Gaza Strip and achieve an extended
ceasefire with it, in exchange for significant economic benefits.

Israeli Society: Challenges to Societal Resilience

The sixth chapter discusses Israeli society in 2019, characterized first and foremost by the broad implications of the
ongoing political crisis following two rounds of national elections and preparations for the third round in March 2020.
This electoral impasse involved the inability to form a coalition government, and restricted the regular performance
of government offices and the ability of a transition government to make decisions on critical issues. In tandem,
2019 was characterized by widening public disputes stemming from diverse worldviews, especially regarding the
necessary balance between national and religious values and democratic, liberal, secular ideals.

The past year also saw a further weakening of the sense of solidarity within Israeli society. This is typified by the
socio-economic gaps between the rich and the poor and between the center and the periphery. Overall it appears
that even if Israel is a state with significant internal robustness, this past year has seen more disconcerting signs
that point to an accelerated trend of weakening social solidarity within social groups, between social groups and
the state, and between the individual and the state.

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