Page 12 - INSS | 2019-2020

Under conditions of a large-scale military conflict, public mobilization and the demonstration of support for the IDF
would be expected, as in the past. However, a prolonged conflict and large number of casualties and damage to the
home front, without sufficient civilian preparedness, might undermine societal resilience. This could be reflected in the
state’s economic and civil abilities to manage daily life successfully during times of emergency and maintain functional
continuity during a conflict, and could even disrupt the subsequent recovery process. Therefore, Israel should invest
in system-wide preparation efforts, in accordance with a long range plan, so as to strengthen the preparedness of
the civilian front in Israel through the construction and empowerment of new and existing resilience mechanisms.

The Arab Minority

The State of Israel’s sensitive relations with its Arab minority has experienced many fluctuations and profound changes.
The relationship is shaped by three main trends, fraught with internal contradictions: first is the clear aspiration
among Arabs in Israel, especially among the younger generation, for civil and even political integration, along with
their desire to maintain a separate national identity. The second reveals hostility and distance on the part of a large
portion of the Jewish public toward the Arab minority. The third trend is the relatively successful implementation of
the government decision on the economic development of minority populations in Israel 2016-2020 (Decision 922),
which has already helped accelerate the Arab community’s integration within Israel’s social fabric. A substantive
test of the state’s sensitive relations with the Arab sector will be how it addresses the increasing violence and crime
within the community. Possible success in this crucial field depends greatly on joint efforts – still in their early stages
– between the state’s institutions and the Arab community and its leaderships.

The Operational Environment: New Capabilities of the Radical Shiite Axis

The seventh chapter discusses the operational environment and focuses mainly on the improved military capabilities
of Israel’s enemies – especially those that belong to the radical Shiite axis – as underscored this year by the Iranian
attack on the oil facilities in Saudi Arabia.

This improvement is the result of several interrelated military buildup efforts: increase in the number of rockets and
missiles, both in order to improve organizational survivability and in order to saturate Israel’s air defense systems; an
effort to be armed with precision-guided rockets and missiles that can hit vulnerable civilian sites (electric, gas, and
other national infrastructure) and vulnerable military sites (air force bases and military HQ locations); drones and
other unmanned aerial vehicles, also for the purpose of precision strikes; improved air defense measures in order to
neutralize the impact of Israel’s air force, given its known central role in Israel’s combat doctrine; improvements in
coastal defense systems and naval warfare; development of cyber capabilities; and plans for operating ground forces
in Israeli territory, including with attack tunnels (some of which were exposed and neutralized this year), in order to
disrupt IDF offensive and defensive capabilities and to increase the damage to the stamina of the Israeli home front.

These military buildup efforts are apparently connected to a more fundamental change underway in the military
thought of those identified with the radical Shiite axis. This change leads them from a victory doctrine based on
attrition of the Israeli population (“victory by non-defeat”) to a different doctrine that also seeks to damage Israeli
national infrastructure and essential military capabilities from different arenas (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and perhaps
Yemen) in order to undermine the Israeli system and throw it off balance.

The chapter’s main recommendations are to finalize and fund a multi-year plan for the IDF; prepare for a multi-arena
war as a primary reference scenario; close gaps in the public’s expectations of war in the current era, its cost, and its
possible results; and from the perspectives of the IDF multi-year plan and a broader national perspective, deepen
the discussion on the concepts of victory and military decision in the current era – all within the framework of the
possibilities afforded by advanced technologies.

10 STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL