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The Dynamics of Escalation

Can two parties that are not interested in escalation be dragged into a broad conflict and even a war? While seemingly
the odds are low, in practice, unintended escalation is a historical fact that has even led to some of Israel’s wars (most
recently, Operation Protective Edge). Unintended escalation can result from miscalculations of the enemy, erroneous
identification of the escalation threshold, and conceptual deviations in the decision making process. These are
joined by the increasing difficulty to distinguish between offensive and defensive actions and the dilemma whether
to use or lose essential assets. The circular nature of activity, response and counter-response, may generate such
escalation, even if it runs counter to the two sides’ policies and interests. This sort of dynamic can occur in 2020 in
the northern arena and the Gaza Strip.

Conclusion

It is customary to assume that Israeli deterrence against a large-scale conflict or war is still stable. Indeed, all of the
states and organizations around Israel are well aware of its power and the damage that they would suffer in the case
of such a conflict. Thus, they prefer to refrain from large-scale conflict with Israel and certainly from war.

However, some factors suggest that such a conflict could nonetheless occur in 2020: problematic initiatives by some
parties (Hezbollah’s precision missile project, the Iranian entrenchment in different arenas, and Hamas’s efforts to
impose an arrangement on Israel according to the organization’s conditions) lead Israel to preventive actions that
could lead to escalation; increased risks in Israel’s current operational format in the campaign between wars and a
change in the response policy of Iran and others to Israeli actions; a possible conflict between Iran and the United
States that might include Israel; and the years that have passed since the wars in 2006 (in Lebanon) and 2014 (in
Gaza) that naturally lead to the weakening of restraining factors.

Along with these threats, Israel must cope with the challenges of foreign influence in political processes; the difficulty
in clarifying reality and making decisions in the “post-truth” and “fake news” era; and protection of its intellectual
and technological capital from foreign influence.

Israel therefore faces many active arenas and a series of challenging strategic and operational issues. A strategic
assessment shows the urgent need for an updated, comprehensive Israeli grand strategy that would enable the
obstruction of existing and emerging threats without escalation into a large-scale conflict and war. The seven
chapters of the assessment, written by INSS researchers, describe the complex situations in the various arenas and
include recommendations on what actions Israel should take. The final chapter, by INSS Director Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos
Yadlin, offers a series of recommendations to enable Israel to cope with the complex picture, shape its operational
environment, and strengthen its internal resilience, in order to realize its national security objectives.

National Security, Fake News, and the Cognitive Battle in the Digital Age

The current era is customarily referred to as an age of post-truth and fake news, in which beliefs, opinions, and
emotions exert a greater influence than facts. It is easy in this age to spread lies, distortions, errors, spins, and
conspiracy theories. National security decision making frameworks are not immune to these phenomena, and must
contend with an increasing difficulty to decipher and understand reality, and thereafter take correct decisions. This
difficulty is not the result of one factor, rather stems from the confluence of elements related to political, technological,
social, and conceptual changes in the contemporary era. These changes transform the cognitive battle among both
decision makers and the general public into a central element in political and military conflicts.

2020 STRATEGIC OVERVIEW 11