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the economy (trade, investments, energy, transportation, means of production, infrastructure); technology and
innovation (artificial intelligence, advanced communication, quantum computing, data); and defense (robotics and
autonomous weapons, cyber, the space race, control of weapons of mass destruction).
As part of this competition, the “international liberal order” – led by the United States, and as it existed since the
end of World War II – has been gradually challenged and undermined, mainly by China and Russia, but also by
the Trump administration. At the same time, many states are attempting to restore control over sovereignty and
leadership in areas that were “expropriated” from them as part of globalization processes. The current international
system is divided and polarized, and around the world more and more populist leaders have arisen and advance
a policy of isolationism, national seclusion, anti-globalization, and erosion of liberal norms. These processes have
a direct impact on the limits of performance, attention, and willingness to invest resources in international efforts.
Agreements that were achieved in the past are reopened and breached (climate, institutions, weapons control,
conflicts), and the decreased willingness for cooperation makes it difficult to cope with existing and future problems
and with cross-border challenges. In the background, a slowdown in the global economy is expected and possibly
even an economic crisis, in part due to increasing competition that has escalated into rivalry that is reflected not
only in the trade war between the United States and China, but also between other trade and economic partners.
This global polarization is influenced in part by major internal challenges facing each of the four world powers: the
United States is entering a turbulent election year (including impeachment proceedings against President Trump),
which will exacerbate existing trends of internal polarization, political volatility, and an isolationist approach that
strives to reduce investment in foreign affairs, except for the purpose of short term political gain; China is coping
with reduced growth and with challenges to domestic stability, and investing resources to tighten its control in the
domestic arena while continuing its technological and economic growth, along with increased assertiveness and
expansion of influence in the external arena; in Russia, internal challenges and public fatigue regarding international
adventures strengthen those in the Kremlin who seek to make the most of détente processes with the West, while using
crises such as Ukraine and Syria as bargaining chips; and in Europe, stability is undermined by domestic challenges
(expanding economic gaps among the population, refugees and migration, the growing strength of extremists on the
right and left, and the intensifying debate between supporters of the Union and those who support nationalism, of
which the Brexit crisis is the most prominent symbol). In addition, there are changes in the intra-European balance
of power (the end of the Merkel era and the increased standing of Macron) and the growing discourse on the need
to reduce defense and economic dependence on the United States.
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