Page 19 - INSS | 2019-2020

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been relegated to the margins of international
attention (including that of the United States and Europe), and there is less
willingness to invest political resources in it. Consequently, Israel’s policy
on the issue carries greater weight as the principal shaping factor. However,
an American desire for achievements in advance of elections could push the
administration to seek quick partial agreements (on Iran, the Palestinian issue,
and China) with high visibility (even if at the expense of substance) that will not
necessarily converge with Israeli interests.

Along with the growing challenges, Israel has “dual equity” for the superpowers
in sporting relative advantages in key areas (technology, military, cyber, counter-
terrorism) while having the potential to cause damage and escalation. Despite
the close relations with the Trump administration, Israel could find itself in increasing friction with the United States
in light of several factors: different stances and conflicting interests, such as deepening relations with China – the
United States’ main competitor-rival – in trade, innovation, and technology; American political initiatives on core
issues for Israel (Iran and the Palestinians) that could be incompatible with Israeli stances and interests; and Israeli
activity in Iran and Iraq that could be perceived as endangering American forces.

In this context, it seems that the chaos in the US administration, the policy vicissitudes, and the clear and frequent
gaps between the President and the establishment challenge Israel’s influence on US policy on vital issues. The
closeness with President Trump, against the backdrop of increasing political-social polarization in the United States,
erodes bipartisan support for Israel – the most important asset underlying relations between the countries – and
over time could undermine support for Israel among the Jewish community and the general public, and as a result,
in Congress as well.

On a different matter, along with trends of socio-political polarization in the West, internal crises in some European
states, and the social and political divisions and forthcoming elections in the United States, there has been a rise
in global antisemitism (including in establishments, such as in Britain, Germany, Hungary, and Poland); greater
delegitimization of Israel (among liberal-progressive groups, minorities, and younger populations); and growing
alienation of the Diaspora from Israel (particularly among US Jewry).

Recommendations for Israeli Policy

Israel must adjust its policy to the era of strategic competition between the world powers, in accordance with three
main guidelines:

First – preparing in the medium and long term for the day after Trump and Merkel (Israel’s most important friends)
by restoring and consolidating bipartisan support in the United States (specifically, dialogue with the Democratic
party and its supporters, and non-intervention in the elections and non-involvement in the issues under dispute in
the internal political discourse); and reestablishing a strategic dialogue with Europe, based on shared interests and
values and Israel’s technology, innovation, and defense assets.

Second – promoting Israel’s technological assets, including in the framework of the strategic competition between the
world powers, through a combined policy centered on developing cooperation with the United States (establishing
a “strategic innovation alliance”) and deepening the entry into growing markets, while carefully managing the risks
to strategic relations with the United States (and in particular the need for in-depth coordination regarding relations
with China and channels of communication with Russia).

Third – demonstrating more active interest and involvement in the challenges facing Jewish communities around
the world (continuity, connection to Israel, struggle against antisemitism); defining the development of Israel’s
relations with the Diaspora as a high priority national mission (educational infrastructure, meetings and dialogue,
joint activity); and considering the world Jewish community in internal decision making processes on core issues
that also affect them.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 17